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INTRODUCTION
This booklet provides background on three proposed changes in the 
Code of Professional Ethics and the By-Laws of the Institute.
All of the proposals have been approved by the Council of the In­
stitute, on the recommendation of the executive committee. The pro­
posal to amend the By-Laws to increase the size of the executive commit­
tee originated with the committee on structure. The proposal to repeal 
Rule 3.03 of the Code on competitive bidding has the unanimous approval 
of the committee on professional ethics as well as the executive committee. 
The proposal in regard to the disciplinary provisions of the By-Laws is 
jointly sponsored by the Trial Board and the ethics committee.
In accordance with the By-Laws, the proposals were included in the 
call to the annual meeting held in Boston, Mass., on October 3, 1966, 
for discussion without action.
The By-Laws also provide that, following the annual meeting, the 
proposed amendments shall be submitted to all members for a vote by 
mail ballot, accompanied by a statement prepared by the secretary 
summarizing the arguments presented for and against them.
This booklet is issued in conformity with these requirements. The 
presentation of each proposal is in two parts: an historical summary of 
the considerations which led to the recommendation, and a resume of the 
discussion, if any, which occurred on the proposal at the annual meeting.
In order to become effective, the proposed amendments must be 
voted upon by at least one-third of the members and must be approved 
by at least two-thirds of those voting.
The ballots will be valid and counted only if received by March 20, 
1967, as provided in the By-Laws. Ballots should also be signed; unsigned 
ballots will not be counted.





Repeal of Rule 3.03 on Competitive Bidding
I. Background
The Institute has had a prohibition against competitive bidding in its 
ethical code for a quarter of a century. The original rule, adopted in 
1941, precluded a member from making a competitive bid for profes­
sional engagements in any state whose CPA society or accountancy 
board prohibited such bids.
The present Rule, adopted in 1962, constitutes an outright prohibi­
tion of competitive bidding. It reads as follows (Article 3, Rule 3.03, 
of the Code of Professional Ethics):
A member or associate shall not make a  competitive bid for a  pro­
fessional engagement. Competitive bidding for public accounting 
services is not in the public interest, is a  form of solicitation, and is 
unprofessional.
All of the discussion which led to the adoption of the revised Rule 
clearly indicates that it was not intended to deprive the public of the 
right to obtain estimates of the cost of professional services. On the con­
trary, the Rule was designed to protect the public against any unscru­
pulous practitioner who might seek to acquire clients by offering to 
perform services at a fee so low as to make it impossible for him—  
without a financial sacrifice—to comply with professional standards in 
the conduct of his work. Such a price-cutting approach to a professional 
practice, if widely adopted, could depress the quality of accounting serv­
ices, and this in turn would adversely affect the public welfare.
When the proposed revision of the Rule was discussed at the annual 
meeting in 1961, the committee on professional ethics promised to develop 
an official interpretation of it which would seek to clarify the distinc­
tion between a competitive bid and a legitimate response to a prospective 
client’s request for an estimate of the cost of an engagement.
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In the process of working with the committee in the formulation of 
this interpretive opinion, the Institute’s legal counsel, Covington & Burl­
ing, became increasingly convinced that it was “highly probable” that any 
challenge to the legality of Rule 3.03 in a proceeding brought under the 
Federal anti-trust law would be sustained in the courts.
The executive committee then engaged the law firm of Cahill, Gordon, 
Reindel & Ohl of New York to undertake an independent appraisal of the 
question. The second firm strongly supported the opinion of Covington 
& Burling that, under developing legal concepts, it would be wise to repeal 
the competitive bidding rule because of the grave risk of being found 
in violation of the anti-trust laws.
The views of counsel were reported to the executive committee early 
in the fall of 1965. It was extremely difficult for the committee to accept 
the possibility that a professional society could be placed in legal jeopardy 
by its efforts to maintain a high quality of service to the public. However, 
the committee reluctantly felt that it could not afford to disregard the 
advice of law firms with extensive experience in anti-trust litigation.
The committee, therefore, alerted the Council to the problem at the 
fall meeting of the Institute’s governing body in Dallas, Texas, on Septem­
ber 18, 1965, and indicated that it planned to conduct a comprehensive 
review of the situation during the six months prior to the spring meeting 
of Council.
Representatives of counsel were invited to appear before separate 
meetings of the executive committee and the committee on professional 
ethics to respond to inquiries designed to explore all aspects of the 
situation.
After these appearances, both committees voted unanimously to 
recommend to Council that an amendment repealing Rule 3.03 should 
be submitted to the members for a mail ballot.
At its meeting last May, the Institute’s governing body approved the 
recommendation by a vote of 135 to 53.
Following this action by Council, it became apparent from members’ 
inquiries that some apprehension existed about the effects of a repeal of 
the competitive bidding rule. It was suggested, for example, that if the 
Rule were deleted from the Code, other provisions would have no bearing 
on the adequacy of quoted fees. In view of these concerns, the committee 
on professional ethics met on August 16 and unanimously agreed to 
issue an opinion which states in effect that the quoting of a clearly inade­
quate fee may in some circumstances be regarded as evidence of a viola­
tion of the solicitation rule (3.02) or of the rule on reporting standards 
(2.02). The opinion, which will be effective whether or not the rule 
against competitive bidding is repealed, reads as follows:
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Opinion No. 18: Fees and Professional Standards
In determining the amount of his fee, a CPA may assess the 
degree of responsibility being assumed in the engagement, the time 
and manpower required to perform the service in conformity with 
the standards of the profession, the skills needed to discharge his pro­
fessional obligation to the client and the public, the value to the 
client of the services rendered, and the customary charges of profes­
sional colleagues. Other considerations may also be involved. No 
single factor can be controlling.
It is characteristic of all professional persons to be more con­
cerned with fulfilling their responsibilities to the public than with 
immediate financial reward. On occasions they may appropriately 
choose to serve a client for a fee less than cost, or indeed without any 
compensation whatever.
However, to quote a fee in advance of an engagement in an 
amount clearly inadequate to provide fair compensation for perform­
ing service in accordance with accepted professional standards may 
be regarded, in some circumstances, as evidence of solicitation in 
violation of Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Ethics. Without 
attempting to specify all circumstances that might be relevant in 
determining the propriety of a particular quotation, it would be ap­
propriate to consider whether there were any facts suggesting that 
such inadequate fee had been fixed as a part of a plan or design to 
solicit business.
In such cases of inadequate fees there may be a temptation to 
minimize losses by reducing the amount of work below that required 
by Rule 2.02 of the Code, with serious consequences for third parties 
who rely upon opinions on financial statements.
II. Discussion at Annual Meeting
1. Arguments for Repeal
The basic question involved in this issue can be simply stated: is 
Rule 3.03 on competitive bidding likely to be considered by the courts 
to be in violation of the anti-trust laws of the United States?
Two eminent law firms, after exhaustive research, have advised the 
Institute that in their considered judgment a substantial anti-trust hazard 
does exist. (The opinions of both firms appear in a separate booklet which 
accompanies the membership ballot.)
The main points in their opinions can be summarized in these words: 
1. The Sherman Act declares that “every contract, combination . . .
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or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States” 
is illegal. Among the restraints covered by the statutes are all agreements 
among competitors relating to prices. Regardless of the difficulties in 
applying Rule 3.03 in a particular situation, it obviously enjoins members 
from attempting to obtain clients by engaging in price competition. It is, 
in effect, an agreement among the members that they will not engage in 
price competition.
2. Among the restraints of trade covered by the Sherman Act are 
all agreements among competitors relating to prices. Although this is 
often described as directed against “price fixing,” it is not confined to 
agreements to fix particular prices. It applies broadly to all agreements 
among competitors that suppress or restrain price competition in any 
way. Such agreements are illegal per se—that is, they cannot be justified 
on any grounds including the contention that (as in the case of Rule 3.03) 
the objective was protection of the public welfare. As the United States 
Supreme Court has stated in one case: “Congress has not left with us 
the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are 
wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry 
of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price- 
fixing conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive 
abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the good 
intentions of the members of the combination.”
3. The prohibitions in the Sherman Act are limited to activities in 
restraint of interstate trade or commerce. The courts in recent years, 
however, have increasingly broadened the concept of interstate com­
merce. There seems little reason to assume, in view of the scope and 
nature of the practices of many members, that the courts would hold 
that the accounting profession was essentially local in character. More­
over, while a substantial number of members may largely operate within 
the boundaries of a single state, Rule 3.03 does not apply to them alone; 
it applies to all members.
4. The anti-trust statutes refer to “trade or commerce,” and it may 
be argued that this term does not embrace a professional service. It is 
true that the U. S. Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the question 
of whether the practice of law, medicine or accounting is “trade or com­
merce” within the meaning of the Sherman Act. But after a review of the 
cases cited in their opinion, the Institute’s counsel concludes that “it is 
likely that the Supreme Court would hold* that the professions do not 
enjoy any general immunity from the application of the Sherman Act.” 
Even if it be assumed, however, that the Supreme Court might apply more 
lenient standards to the rules and regulations of professional societies 
than it applies to ordinary commercial activities, the Institute’s counsel
Arguments for Repeal ( continued)
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Arguments for Repeal ( continued)
concludes that the Court is not likely to relax anti-trust standards to the 
point of permitting the members of professional societies to engage in 
arrangements that restrict price competition.
None of the official agencies of the Institute which approved the sub­
mission of this amendment to repeal Rule 3.03—the executive commit­
tee, the committee on professional ethics, and the Council—is in favor 
of competitive bidding. The Rule was adopted, in all good faith, as a 
measure of protection for the public. A professional accounting service 
is not a commodity which can be delivered at a predetermined price 
based on a set of precise specifications. Only the CPA himself is really 
qualified to evaluate the amount of work which is required in a particular 
engagement to enable him to comply with the profession’s standards and 
thus discharge his obligation to all those who may rely upon him. Any 
approach which appears to place a premium on price is certain to gen­
erate destructive tensions within the profession; but, even more impor­
tantly, it may have the effect in some instances of depressing the quality 
of the CPA’s services—and this could result in grave injury to the public.
However, all the members of the executive committee and the ethics 
committee, and the large majority of Council who voted in favor of repeal 
became convinced that the social desirability of the Rule was unlikely to 
sustain it in an anti-trust proceeding, that the adverse consequences flowing 
from such a proceeding would be substantial, and that the objective of 
the Rule could be achieved by legal means without running the risks 
inherent in retention of the Rule.
Even with the deletion of the Rule from the Institute’s Code, Opinion 
No. 18 of the ethics committee suggests that members should set their 
fees in the light of the responsibilities imposed upon them by Rule 3.02 
on solicitation and Rule 2.02 on reporting standards.
Moreover, in some 37 states, the state boards of accountancy have 
issued regulations against competitive bidding comparable to the Insti­
tute’s Rule. Similar action could be taken in the other states— except 
possibly in the few states with anti-trust statutes of their own. If certain 
conditions are or have been met in the issuance of these regulations, it 
seems clear that they are immune to any challenge under the Federal 
anti-trust laws. In addition, of course, the board rules apply to all CPAs 
—not merely to members of the Institute.
It is argued that the Institute’s repeal of Rule 3.03 would lead state 
boards to consider repeal of their own rules on competitive bidding. 
The basis for this argument has never been explained, and there appears 
to be no justification for it in the light of counsel’s opinion that state 
board rules have an entirely different legal status.
Several other aspects of this question deserve consideration.
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It may be contended that the absence of any legal assault on the Rule 
over an extended period justifies the assumption that no attack is likely 
to be directed against it in the future.
This contention, in the words of one of the legal opinions filed with 
the Institute, suggests “the triumph of hope over experience.” Nor should 
any comfort be derived from the fact that other professional organiza­
tions may have prohibitions on competitive bidding which have not as 
yet been challenged. In the view of the attorneys consulted by the Institute, 
these organizations are equally vulnerable to attack under the anti-trust 
laws.
In evaluating the prospects of a challenge to the legality of the Rule, 
it is essential for everyone concerned about the welfare of the Institute 
to consider the penalties, which might be inflicted upon it if the challenge 
proved successful.
They could be severe.
The Federal government could bring criminal proceedings in which 
the penalties against each defendant could be a fine of up to $50,000, or 
imprisonment up to one year, or both, for each offense under each section 
of the Act. The Institute could be a defendant in such a proceeding. Also, 
any Council member, officer, staff executive, or committee member, who 
had authorized, ordered or done anything to enforce, to apply or to in­
terpret the Rule might be a defendant.
The Federal government could also bring a civil suit to enjoin the 
enforcement of the Rule or to order its deletion from the Code.
In addition, it could bring a civil suit to recover simple damages for 
any money damages suffered by it or any of its agencies that were caused 
by the Rule.
Private persons, and states, municipalities and agencies thereof could 
also recover treble damages suffered by them that were caused by the 
Rule plus a reasonable fee for their attorney. They might also obtain 
injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Rule.
Among the situations which might cause the legality of the Rule to 
be raised in one or more of the above described proceedings are:
(a) Attempted enforcement of the Rule against a member of the 
Institute. This might result in a treble damage and injunction suit by the 
member or a complaint by the member to the Department of Justice 
resulting in its instituting a criminal or civil proceeding;
(b) A municipal agency or corporation, which is aggrieved because 
it could not obtain competitive bids for accounting services, might institute 
legal proceedings on its own behalf as indicated above as a private person 
or it might complain to the Department of Justice and thus instigate a civil 
or criminal proceeding by it. The same thing could happen in the case of
Arguments for Repeal ( continued)
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Arguments for Repeal ( continued)
a Federal agency which had been thwarted in an attempt to get competi­
tive bids. Although it could not sue independently, it could certainly 
complain to the Department of Justice and it must be assumed that its 
complaint would receive serious attention.
In view of the possible drastic penalties, those involved in the dis­
ciplinary machinery of the Institute are naturally reluctant to summon 
any member to trial for engaging in competitive bidding. No action, in 
fact, has yet been taken under the Rule. None is likely to occur in the 
future. The Rule, therefore, is already inoperative.
It may be suggested that the mere existence of the Rule—even though 
it may not have been enforced—has had a salutary effect in discouraging 
a price-cutting approach to the professional practice of accounting, and 
that this result has been beneficial in protecting the public. But the failure 
to enforce a rule can also encourage a cynical attitude toward the entire 
Code of Professional Ethics.
The decision to seek repeal of Rule 3.03 is based on the considered 
view of the Institute’s counsel—a view strongly endorsed by another 
firm—that it is “highly probable” that the Rule would be declared illegal 
in any proceeding brought under the anti-trust laws.
That view is both supported and challenged by other attorneys con­
sulted by a few state societies and members.
The opposing opinions which have been made available to the Insti­
tute have been carefully reviewed by Covington & Burling—and nothing 
in them has led the firm to alter its own judgment that the courts would 
hold that the Rule constitutes a violation of the anti-trust laws.
The opposing opinions, indeed, provide no adequate assurance to 
the contrary. One of the opinions cited on the floor of the annual business 
session at Boston, while deprecating the likelihood of an attack on the 
Rule, conceded that, “. . . any judgment (on this point) must be far from 
firm.”
But since the resources of the Institute—not to mention the safety 
of those involved in its disciplinary procedures—may be at stake, the lack 
of any certainty on the legality of the Rule is in itself sufficient cause to 
recommend its deletion.
This argument, of course, can be turned around. It can be claimed 
that since the Institute’s own counsel suggests that an adverse verdict is 
only “highly probable,” any challenge to the legality of the Rule should 
be contested through the highest tribunal in the land. Any such effort, 
however, is certain to be costly—not merely in terms of legal expense, 
but in terms of the damage which might be inflicted upon the Institute’s 
reputation as a result of the attendant publicity. For any complaint or 
indictment brought against the Institute is certain to include charges of
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improper and self-seeking practices— and it is a fact of life that the charges 
are likely to gain greater press attention and linger longer in the public 
mind than a later vindication. It is conceivable that the Institute might 
win in the courts—only to lose far more in the forums of public opinion.
As one member in industry observed in the discussion at the annual 
meeting, most responsible men in industry and elsewhere who have occa­
sion to seek the services of CPAs understand the undesirability of com­
petitive bidding. This public support, he added, would be destroyed if the 
Institute persisted in a course which would be regarded as willful dis­
obedience of the law.
It is argued that more time should have been devoted to the question 
before the membership was asked to eliminate a significant provision 
of the Code. But those who felt obliged to recommend repeal of the Rule 
—the executive committee, the ethics committee and the law firms which 
advised them—have already invested a substantial amount of time in 
studying the problem for more than a year.
It is also argued that the repeal amendment should be rejected to 
permit an exploration of alternative actions which might minimize any 
adverse effect of the repeal. But this exploration would not be precluded 
by repeal of the Rule. Indeed, such an effort has already been undertaken 
by the ethics committee in its Opinion No. 18 on Fees and Professional 
Standards.
Any delay in repealing the Rule, moreover, would be an act of im­
prudence. The danger inherent in continuance of the Rule, in the judg­
ment of competent legal counsel, is “clear and present.” Those who bear 
the burden of protecting the funds and the reputation of the Institute 
cannot, in good conscience, ignore their advice.
The time to repeal Rule 3.03, therefore, is now.
2. Arguments Against Repeal
The proposal to repeal Rule 3.03 involves two vital issues—not just 
one.
The first of these, obviously, is the question of the legality of the 
Rule under the anti-trust laws. But the second issue is of equal or perhaps 
even greater significance. That issue is the responsibility of the Institute in 
maintaining high standards of professional conduct for the protection 
of the public.
Both of these issues deserve the thoughtful consideration of every 
member.
The Institute’s legal counsel has announced that it is “highly prob­
able” that the Rule would be declared illegal if challenged in the courts
Arguments for Repeal ( continued)
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under the Sherman Act. It is no reflection upon the firm to observe that 
this is merely an opinion—and a somewhat provisional one at that. Other 
lawyers could come to a different conclusion—and, indeed, they have.
The views of two other lawyers, one of whom was retained by a special 
committee of a state society and the other retained by an accounting firm, 
were cited during the discussion of the proposed repeal at the annual 
meeting in Boston.
The opinion of one of them made these points:
1. The U. S. Supreme Court has not passed on the question of whether 
or not the practice of medicine, law or accounting is in “trade or com­
merce;” but even if it should so determine, there must additionally be 
an act in restraint of trade.
2. Rule 3.03 is not (as suggested by the Institute’s counsel) “an agree­
ment among the members that they will not engage in price competition” 
because an audit report involves the reputation of a CPA, and a third 
party who relies upon it has a cause of action against the accountant who 
is guilty of issuing a false or misleading report.
3. The effect of Rule 3.03 is not price fixing because competitive 
bidding implies that the client would determine the scope of the audit, 
including the extent of the tests to be made by the auditor.
4. It is inconceivable that the Justice Department would take an 
interest in the question of competitive bidding as applied to accountants 
and the other professions where the overall public policy existing in the 
various states is opposed to the awarding of contracts for professional 
services on a competitive basis—particularly because the independence 
of the professions has been a long cherished tradition.
5. It is equally inconceivable that a private person or third party 
could establish a case based on the failure to receive competitive bids 
for an audit unless it be a suit by a disgruntled stockholder against a 
corporation’s directors for not securing bids on the theory that the com­
pany might have saved some money. This seems quite remote because 
a matter of business judgment on the part of corporate directors, in the 
absence of fraud or gross negligence, is not ordinarily actionable.
The following two sentences were quoted at the annual meeting from 
another opinion: “Though any judgment must be far from firm, my con­
clusion is that Rule 3.03 of the Code of Professional Ethics would not 
likely provoke an anti-trust attack by the Justice Department. Equally 
important, should the provision be attacked in a private treble-damage 
suit by a disgruntled accounting firm or by a client, chances would be 
good for a successful defense in the court.” It is important to note that 
the lawyer who rendered that opinion headed the Anti-Trust Division 
of the Justice Department some years ago.
Arguments Against Repeal (continued)
15
Neither of these opinions preclude the possibility of an attack upon 
the Rule on anti-trust grounds; but they do raise a reasonable doubt about 
the likelihood of such a challenge— or its success if it should ever mate­
rialize.
This doubt is further strengthened by the fact that other professional 
organizations—the American Institute of Architects, the American 
Society of Civil Engineers, the American Bar Association, to name only 
a few—have adopted injunctions against competitive bidding for profes­
sional engagements. Like the Institute’s Rule, these proscriptions of bid­
ding have existed for a number of years. Yet none of them—nor the 
Institute’s own Rule—has so far been subjected to legal challenge. It seems 
particularly absurd for CPAs to be concerned about a legal problem 
which apparently does not trouble the legal profession.
Why, after such an extended period of immunity, should such an 
attack be mounted now?
It is not enough, in response to this inquiry, to refer vaguely to “de­
veloping legal concepts” or to speculate about what might happen on the 
basis of what has already occurred when the legal lessons of the past are 
not clear. This kind of reply is simply not good enough to justify taking 
an action of grave import to the profession and to the public which it seeks 
to serve with distinction.
Even if the apprehensions of the Institute’s counsel are reasonable, 
however, the Institute ought not to be a victim of panic and take a hasty 
action which it may later regret.
The present rule on competitive bidding was adopted only five years 
ago. It concludes with the observation that competitive bidding “is not in 
the public interest, is a form of solicitation, and is unprofessional.”
What has happened in this short interval to suggest that these reasons 
in support of a prohibition against competitive bidding are no longer 
valid?
If nothing has happened to invalidate them, then the Institute should 
not be prepared to sacrifice a rule designed for the protection of the 
public because two law firms have expressed the belief that a legal cloud 
now hangs over it.
As a responsible organization representing a profession dedicated to 
public service, the Institute has an obligation to defend the Rule against 
any and all attacks— all the way to the United States Supreme Court if 
necessary.
The commitment to retain the Rule might obviously require a heavy 
expenditure of funds; but if the profession remains convinced that com­
petitive bidding injures the public, then the funds of the Institute could 
not be utilized in a better cause.
Arguments Against Repeal ( continued)
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Nor should the specter—real or imagined—of public criticism deter 
the Institute from pursuing this course if conscience dictates it. No doubt 
some ill-informed observers might leap to the conclusion that the profes­
sion was solely concerned about advancing its own self-interest if it 
resisted any effort to nullify the competitive bidding rule. But an equal 
number—perhaps a greater number—would be impressed by an organi­
zation which was prepared to run serious risks in defense of a professional 
standard which protects the public welfare.
But even if the consequences of resistance prove to be as dire as pre­
dicted, this would still not justify a retreat from principle.
It is suggested that the Rule is already a “dead letter” because the 
threat of legal action inhibits its enforcement. The failure to apply it is 
regrettable; but even if it is not enforced, its presence in the Code at least 
proclaims the profession’s distaste for an unseemly practice which en­
courages substandard performance—and this alone may have a beneficial 
influence.
It is suggested, too, that the Institute’s Rule is hardly necessary because 
the state boards of accountancy, with legal impunity, can proscribe com­
petitive bidding by a properly devised regulation—and that many of them 
have already done so. However, any reliance placed by the profession on 
state board rules may prove to be illusory, because repeal of the Institute’s 
Rule would cause the rules of the state boards to erode. They would 
become difficult to enforce and eventually would be eliminated. In any 
case, it will require a substantial effort to obtain enabling legislation to 
permit the other boards to adopt such regulations—and some will never 
be allowed to do so because of the existence of a state anti-trust statute.
It is argued, further, that Opinion No. 18 of the committee on profes­
sional ethics provides ample protection against any of the hazards en­
visioned by opponents of repeal. The latter, however, consider Opinion 
No. 18 to be neither strong nor direct and an inadequate substitute for the 
Rule itself. The Opinion is merely the statement of a committee and thus 
lacks the force of a rule approved by the full membership.
Much has been made of the fact— and it is a fact—that the Council 
approved the amendment for repeal for submission to the membership 
by a vote of 135 to 53. But it is also a fact that at that time members of 
Council were provided only with oral advice by the Institute’s counsel; they 
did not have the benefit of a written statement from the Institute’s counsel, 
nor were they aware of other opinions which, at least, suggest that the legal 
question does not have only one answer. And it is also a fact worthy of 
note that a switch in only 42 votes would have led to the defeat of the 
proposal.
Arguments Against Repeal ( continued)
17
There has not been sufficient time since this subject was first exposed 
to the membership to consider various alternatives to the present Rule, if 
indeed an equally effective alternative can be found. The opponents of 
repeal of Rule 3.03, although open-minded on the subject of such an 
alternative, do not at this time concede that it can be found.
The proposal to repeal Rule 3.03 is so vital to the public interest and 
to the standards of our profession that more time, thought and appraisal 
should be devoted to it. The Rule, therefore, should be retained, and this 
conclusion expressed by a negative vote on the proposal to repeal it.
Arguments Against Repeal ( continued)
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PROPOSAL NO. 2 
Amendments to Disciplinary 
Clauses of By-Laws
I. Background
The proposed changes in the By-Laws originated with the Trial 
Board and the committee on professional ethics. They have been ap­
proved by the executive committee and the Council for submission to 
the membership in a mail ballot.
The purpose of these proposed changes is to facilitate the function­
ing of the Institute’s disciplinary machinery. Under the present By-Laws, 
a member convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude may be expelled 
only after a hearing by the Trial Board (or a sub-board). If it is found 
that he has been convicted, expulsion is mandatory; yet the process may 
consume many months. In addition, when a member’s CPA certificate has 
been revoked for disciplinary reasons, he must still be brought to trial; and 
although expulsion under these circumstances is virtually certain (al­
though not mandatory), the elaborate process of trial is required. The 
proposed amendment would enable the Institute to terminate promptly 
and automatically the membership of a member who has clearly lost his 
claim to professional status—without an elaborate and costly trial having 
a predictable result.
Moreover, in these cases, the Institute would not be obliged to say, 
as it now must say on occasion, that a member has not yet been disci­
plined by his professional society even though he has been convicted of 
a serious crime or has been deprived of his CPA certificate.
It is also proposed that a new section be added to the By-Laws to 
permit the reinstatement by the Trial Board after a three-year lapse of a 
member who has been expelled or whose membership has been terminated 
for disciplinary reasons. Under the present By-Laws, there is no such 
provision for reinstatement, except when a member’s criminal conviction 
has been reversed or when the Trial Board has rescinded a prior decision.
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Since an expelled member is now permanently barred from membership, 
the Trial Board has occasionally tended to avoid expulsion in borderline 
cases simply because of the permanent nature of the expulsion. The pro­
posed amendment takes into account the possibility that an expelled 
member might pay his debt to society, rehabilitate himself, and regain 
his professional status.
In addition, a member deprived of membership under the automatic 
provisions would be automatically reinstated if his conviction for a seri­
ous crime or his loss of the CPA certificate upon which the disciplinary 
action was based is later set aside.
Finally, the proposed amendments include a new provision which 
states, in effect, that a member renders himself liable to explusion or 
suspension if he fails to cooperate with the committee on professional 
ethics in its investigation of any complaint against him. This is intended 
to apply to members who simply refuse to respond to inquiries from 
the ethics committee; it is not directed against a member who, on the 
advice of legal counsel, declines to provide information for the time being 
on the grounds that his rights in a pending legal action might be prejudiced.
One further comment is in order. Three years ago, the membership 
was asked to vote on a proposed change in the By-Laws which would 
have called for the suspension without prejudice of a member who had 
been indicted for a serious crime. This 1963 proposal, which failed to 
obtain the required two-thirds favorable vote of the membership, differs 
materially from the current proposal. The current amendment would 
require action only after conviction of a criminal offense.
The text of the proposed changes in the By-Laws, showing all dele­
tions, additions and other language changes necessitated by the amend­
ments, appears in the appendix of this booklet.
II. Discussion at Annual Meeting
Although an expression of any opposing viewpoints in regard to 
these amendments was invited, none occurred at the annual meeting.
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PROPOSAL NO. 3
By-Law Amendment to Increase
Size of Executive Committee
I. Background
This proposal originated with the committee on structure. In a report 
distributed to all members of the Institute last summer, the committee 
suggested that the executive committee should be strengthened to enable 
it to provide over-all direction to the broadening programs of the Institute.
The proposal, approved for submission to the membership by the 
executive committee and the Council, would expand the size of the execu­
tive committee from 13 to 16 members by adding the immediate past 
president of the Institute and by increasing the number of elected mem­
bers from seven to nine. In order to gain additional continuity in service 
on the committee, the proposal also would establish three-year terms for 
the elected members.
To give effect to this recommended change it is proposed that Arti­
cle IX, Section 2, paragraph (b), of the By-Laws be amended to read 
in its entirety as follows:
The executive committee shall consist of the president, the four vice 
presidents, the treasurer, the immediate past president, and nine other 
members or former members of the Council who shall be elected by the 
Council. Of the nine members to be so elected in 1967, three shall serve 
for one year, three for two years, and three for three years, or until their 
successors have been elected. Thereafter, beginning in 1968, the Council 
shall annually elect three members to serve for three years, or until their 
successors have been elected. Vacancies occurring among the elected 
members shall be filled by the Council for the unexpired terms. No 
elected member who has served for a full three-year term shall be eligible
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for reelection until the annual meeting of the Institute next following 
completion of his term of service. Seven members shall constitute a 
quorum of the committee.
II. Discussion at Annual Meeting




Text of Proposed Amendments to the 
Disciplinary Clauses of the By-Law
It is proposed that Article V and Article VI of the By-Laws be 
amended, as follows:
Change Article V  (proposed additions are in italics) to read in its entirety 
as follows:
Section 1. Resignations of members or associates may be offered in writing 
at any time and shall be effective on the date of acceptance. Action upon the 
resignation of a member or associate in good standing shall be taken by the 
executive committee, and, in the case of a member or associate under charges 
by the Trial Board or a sub-board appointed to hear the case. N o action shall 
be taken on the resignation o f a member or associate with respect to whom  
possible charges are under investigation by the committee on professional 
ethics. Action upon the resignation o f  a member or associate against whom  
charges are pending to be heard by the Trial Board or a sub-board shall be 
taken by the Trial Board or the sub-board appointed to hear the case. Action  
upon the resignation of a member or associate who is suspended under Article 
V, Section 6(a) or (c) shall be taken by the Trial Board or by an ad hoc com ­
mittee thereof consisting of at least five members appointed by the chairman 
o f the Trial Board or vice chairman, when acting as chairman.
Section 2. A  member or associate who fails to pay his annual dues or any 
subscription, assessment, or other obligation to the Institute within five months 
after such debt has become due shall automatically cease to be a member or 
associate of the Institute, unless in the opinion of the executive committee it 
is not in the best interests of the profession that his membership or affiliation 
be terminated in this way.
Section 3. (a ) A  member or associate who shall resign while in good stand­
ing may, upon request made in writing to the Institute, be reinstated by the 
executive committee without a reinstatement fee.
(b ) The executive committee, in its discretion, may reinstate a member 
or an associate whose membership or affiliation has been terminated for non­
payment of dues or any other obligation owing by him to the Institute, pro­
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vided that his reinstatement shall not become effective until he shall have paid 
to the Institute all dues and other obligations owing by him to it at the time 
of such termination, and shall also have paid to it a reinstatement fee in such 
amount, if any, as shall have been determined by a general resolution of the 
Council.
(c ) N o person shall be considered to have resigned while in good standing 
if at the time of his resignation he was in debt to the Institute for dues or other 
obligations. A  member or associate submitting his resignation after the begin­
ning of the fiscal year, but before expiration of the time limit for payment of 
dues or other obligations, may attain good standing by paying dues prorated 
according to the portion of the fiscal year which has elapsed, provided obliga­
tions other than dues shall have been paid in full.
(d ) A  member or associate who has resigned or whose membership or 
affiliation has been terminated in any manner may not file a new application 
for admission but may apply for reinstatement under the applicable provision 
of paragraph (a ) or (b) of this section, or Article VI, Section 5(b) or (c).
Section 4. A  member or associate renders himself liable to expulsion or 
suspension by the Trial Board or a sub-board thereof if
(a) he refuses or neglects to give effect to any decision of the Institute or 
of the Council, or
(b) he infringes any of these By-Laws or any provision of the Code of 
Professional Ethics, or
(c ) he is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to have committed 
any fraud, or
(d ) he is held by the Trial Board or a sub-board thereof to have been 
guilty of an act discreditable to the profession, or to have been convicted o f a 
criminal offense which tends to discredit the profession, or
(e) he is declared by any competent court to be insane or otherwise in­
competent, or
(f )  his certificate as a certified public accountant is suspended, revoked or 
withdrawn by the authority of any state, territory, or territorial possession of 
the United States or the District of Columbia. However, should the secretary 
of the Institute be of the opinion that it may be in the best interest of the Insti­
tute to terminate, without trial, the membership of a member or the affiliation 
of an associate whose certificate has been so suspended, revoked or withdrawn, 
the secretary shall refer the matter to the executive committee. In such event, 
the executive committee may terminate, without trial, such membership or 
affiliation, if it determines that it is in the best interest of the Institute to do so 
or license or permit to practice as such or to practice public accounting is sus­
pended, revoked, withdrawn or cancelled as a disciplinary measure by any 
governmental authority, or
(g) he fails to co-operate with the committee on professional ethics in its 
efforts to ascertain the facts pertaining to whether such member or associate 
is subject to disciplinary action pursuant to the By-Laws o f the Institute. A c ­
cordingly, a member or associate shall respond to communications from  the 
committee requesting information as to such facts within thirty days o f the 
mailing o f such communications by registered mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
to the member or associate concerned at his last known address, according 
to the records o f the Institute.
Section 5. A  member or associate shall be expelled if the Trial Board or a 
sub-board thereof finds, by a majority vote of the members present and en­
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titled to vote, that he has been convicted by a court of a felony or other crime 
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude any of the criminal offenses set 
forth in Article V, Section 6(a), or any crime involving moral turpitude; pro­
vided, in the case o f such a finding by a sub-board, its finding in this respect is 
not reversed by the Trial Board. If the court conviction shall be reversed by a 
higher court, such member or associate may request reinstatement, and such 
request shall be referred to the committee on professional ethics which, after 
investigating all related circumstances, shall report the matter, with the com ­
mittee’s recommendation, to the Trial Board, with respect to cases heard 
initially by it and cases heard by it on review o f a decision o f a sub-board and 
to the sub-board which heard the case, with respect to cases heard by such 
sub-board in which no request for review has been granted. Whereupon the 
Trial Board or sub-board, as applicable, may by a majority vote o f the mem­
bers present and entitled to vote, reinstate such member or associate.
Section 6. (a) The membership or affiliation o f a member or associate who 
is convicted by a court o f any of the following criminal offenses: a crime which 
is defined as a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction; willfully fail­
ing to file any income tax return which he, as an individual taxpayer, is re­
quired to file under the law; willfully attempting to evade or defeat any income 
tax, or the payment thereof, by filing a false and fraudulent income tax return 
on behalf o f himself or a client; or willfully aiding in the preparation or pres­
entation o f a false and fraudulent income tax return o f a client; shall become 
automatically suspended upon mailing a notice o f such suspension, as pro­
vided in paragraph (e) o f this section. Such notice shall be mailed within a 
reasonable time after a certified copy o f a judgment o f conviction o f such 
criminal offense has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(b) The membership or affiliation o f a member or associate who has been 
convicted by a court o f any of the offenses set forth in paragraph (a) o f this 
section, and which conviction has become final, shall become automatically 
terminated upon mailing a notice o f such termination, as provided in para­
graph (e) o f this section. Such notice shall be mailed within a reasonable time 
after a certified copy o f such conviction and evidence that it has become final 
has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(c) The membership or affiliation of a member or associate whose certif­
icate as a certified public accountant or license or permit to practice as such 
or to practice public accounting has been suspended as a disciplinary measure 
by any governmental authority shall, except as provided in paragraph (f) o f this 
section, becom e automatically suspended upon the expiration o f thirty days 
after mailing a notice o f such suspension, as provided in paragraph (e) o f this 
section. Such notice shall be mailed within a reasonable time after a statement 
o f such governmental authority, showing that such certificate, license or permit 
has been suspended and specifying the cause and duration of such suspension 
has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute. Such automatic suspension 
shall cease upon the expiration of the period of suspension so specified.
(d) The membership or affiliation of a member or associate whose certifi­
cate as a certified public accountant or license or permit to practice as such 
or to practice public accounting has been revoked, withdrawn or cancelled 
as a disciplinary measure by any governmental authority shall, except as pro­
vided in paragraph (f) o f this section, becom e automatically terminated upon 
the expiration o f thirty days after mailing a notice o f such termination, as 
provided in paragraph (e) o f this section. Such notice shall be mailed within
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a reasonable time after a statement o f such governmental authority showing 
that such certificate, license or permit has been revoked, withdrawn or can­
celled and specifying the cause of such revocation, withdrawal or cancellation 
has been filed with the secretary o f the Institute.
(e) Notices o f suspension or termination pursuant to paragraph (a), (b), 
(c) or (d) o f this section shall be signed by the secretary o f the Institute and 
mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the member or asso­
ciate concerned at his last known address according to the records o f the 
Institute.
(f) The operation of paragraph (c) or (d) o f this section shall becom e post­
poned if, within thirty days after mailing the notice o f  suspension or termina­
tion, the secretary o f the Institute receives a request from the member or 
associate concerned that the pertinent provision shall not become operative. 
The request shall state briefly the facts and reasons relied upon. A ll such re­
quests shall be referred to the Trial Board for action thereon by the Trial 
Board or by an ad hoc committee thereof consisting o f at least five members 
appointed by the chairman of the Trial Board or vice chairman, when acting 
as chairman.
If the request is denied, the suspension or termination, as the case may be, 
shall becom e effective upon such denial, and the member or associate con­
cerned shall be so notified in writing by the secretary. N o  appeal to the Trial 
Board shall be allowable with respect to a denial o f such a request by the ad 
hoc committee.
I f  the request is granted, the suspension or termination, as the case may be, 
shall not become effective. In such event, the secretary shall transmit the 
matter to the committee on professional ethics to take whatever action it con­
siders proper in the circumstances.
A  determination that paragraph (c) or (d) o f this section shall not become 
operative shall be made only when it clearly appears that, because o f excep­
tional or unusual circumstances, it would be inequitable to permit such auto­
matic suspension or termination.
(g) When a membership or affiliation is suspended or terminated under 
paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) o f this section, a statement o f such suspension or 
termination, giving the reasons therefor, shall be published in The C P A . Such 
statement shall be in a form approved by the chairman o f the Trial Board or 
the vice chairman when acting as such, and shall disclose the name o f the 
member or associate concerned unless the chairman or vice chairman decides 
that the name be omitted.
(h) The provisions o f this section shall not preclude the summoning o f the 
member or associate concerned to appear before the Trial Board or a sub­
board pursuant to Article VI, nor shall it preclude the imposition o f any pen­
alty under Article V, Section 5, or Article VI, Section 3(b), unless his 
membership or affiliation has been terminated pursuant to paragraph (b) or (d) 
of this section.
(i) The period of suspension pursuant to paragraph (a) or (c) o f this section 
shall not be counted in computing the period o f not more than two years, for  
which the Trial Board or a sub-board may suspend a member or associate 
under Article VI, Section 3(b).
Section 6. 7. The Council may, in its discretion, terminate the affiliation 
of an international associate.
Section 8. (a) The provisions o f Article V, Sections 4, 5 and 6 and Article
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VI, Section 1, which became effective on [date o f adoption by members] shall 
not be applied retroactively to any offense or wrongful conduct occurring 
prior to such effective date regardless o f the date o f judgment o f conviction or 
order o f a governmental authority based upon such offense or wrongful conduct. 
Any such offense or wrongful conduct shall be punishable under the pertinent 
By-Law provisions which were in effect immediately prior to such effective 
date. Such By-Law provisions are continued in effect for this purpose.
(b) The provisions o f Article V, Section 3(d) and Article VI, Section 5(b) 
and (c) which became effective on [date o f  adoption by members] shall apply 
retroactively as well as prospectively.
(c) The provisions o f Article V, Section 1, which became effective [date 
o f adoption by members] shall apply after such effective date to any resigna­
tion, regardless o f when submitted.
Change Article V I (proposed additions are in italics) to read in its en­
tirety as follows:
Section 1. Any complaint preferred against a member or associate under 
Section 4 or 5 of Article V  shall be submitted to the committee on professional 
ethics. If, upon consideration of a complaint, it appears to the committee that 
a prima facie case is established showing a violation o f any By-Law or any 
provision of the Code of Professional Ethics or conduct discreditable to a 
public accountant, the committee on professional ethics shall report the matter 
to the secretary of the Institute, who shall summon the member or associate 
involved thereby to appear in answer at the next meeting of the Trial Board 
or any sub-board appointed to hear the case; except that in any case involving a 
prima facie showing of violation of Article V , Section 4, paragraph ( f ) ,  he 
may, in his discretion, submit the matter to the executive committee. In the 
event of such submittal, the executive committee shall either terminate the 
membership or affiliation of such member or associate pursuant to Article V , 
Section 4, paragraph (f )  or summon him to appear in answer at the next 
meeting of the Trial Board or any sub-board appointed to hear the case, pro­
vided, however, that with respect to a case falling within the scope o f  Article 
V, Section 6, such committee shall have discretion as to whether and when to 
report the matter to the secretary for such summoning.
Section 2. If the committee on professional ethics shall dismiss any com ­
plaint preferred against a member or associate, or shall fail to act thereon 
within ninety days after such complaint is presented to it in writing, the mem­
ber or associate preferring the complaint may present the complaint in writing 
to the Trial Board; provided, however, that this provision shall not apply to a 
case falling within the scope o f Article V, Section 6.
The Trial Board shall make such investigation of the matter as it may deem 
necessary, and shall either dismiss the complaint or refer it to the secretary 
of the Institute, who shall summon the member or associate involved thereby 
to appear in answer at the next meeting of the Trial Board or any sub-board 
appointed to hear the case.
Section 3. For the purpose of adjudicating charges against members or 
associates of the Institute, as provided in the foregoing sections:
(a) The secretary of the Institute shall mail to the member or associate 
concerned, at least thirty days prior to the proposed meeting of the Trial 
Board, or any sub-board appointed to hear the case, written notice of the 
charges to be adjudicated. Such notice, when mailed by registered mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the member or associate concerned at his last known
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address, according to the records of the Institute, shall be deemed properly 
served.
(b) After hearing the evidence presented by the committee on profes­
sional ethics or other complainant, and by the defense, the Trial Board or sub­
board hearing the case, by a majority vote of the members present and voting, 
may admonish or suspend, for a period of not more than two years, the m em­
ber or associate against whom complaint is made, or by a two-thirds vote of 
the members present and voting, may expel such member or associate. The 
Trial Board or sub-board hearing the case shall decide, by a majority vote o f  
the members present and voting, whether the statement of the case and the 
decision to be published shall disclose the name of the member or associate 
involved. A  statement of the case and the decision of the Trial Board or sub­
board hearing the case shall be prepared by a member or members of the 
Trial Board or the sub-board, as the case may be, under a procedure to be 
established by such Trial Board or sub-board, and the statement and decision, 
as released by the Trial Board or sub-board, shall be published in The C P A . 
N o such publication shall be made until such decision has become effective, as 
hereinafter provided.
(c ) The member or associate concerned in a case decided by a sub-board 
may request a review by the Trial Board of the decision of the sub-board, pro­
vided such a request for review is filed with the secretary of the Trial Board 
at the principal office of the Institute within thirty days after the decision of the 
sub-board, and shall file with such request such information as may be re­
quired by the rules of the Trial Board. Such a review shall not be a matter of 
right. Each such request for a review shall be considered by an ad hoc com ­
mittee to be appointed by the chairman of the Trial Board, or its vice chairman 
in the event of his unavailability, and composed of not less than five members 
of the Trial Board who did not participate in the prior proceedings in the case. 
The ad hoc committee shall have power to decide whether or not such a request 
for review by the Trial Board shall be allowed, and such committee’s decision 
that such a request shall not be allowed shall be final and subject to no further 
review. A  quorum of such an ad hoc committee shall consist of a majority of 
those appointed. If such a request for review is allowed, the Trial Board shall 
review the decision of the sub-board in accordance with its rules of practice 
and procedure. On review of such a decision the Trial Board may affirm, 
modify, or reverse all or any part of such decision or make such other disposi­
tion of the case as it deems appropriate. The Trial Board may by general rule 
indicate the character of reasons which may be considered to be of sufficient 
importance to warrant an ad hoc committee granting a request for review of 
a decision of a sub-board.
(d ) Any decision of the Trial Board, including any decision reviewing a 
decision of a sub-board, shall become effective when made, unless the Trial 
Board’s decision indicates otherwise, in which latter event it shall become 
effective at the time determined by the Trial Board. Any decision of a sub­
board shall become effective as follow s:
(i) Upon the expiration of thirty days after it is made, if no request 
for review is properly filed within such thirty-day period;
(ii) Upon the denial of a request for review, if such a request has 
been properly filed within the thirty-day period and has become denied 
by the ad hoc committee; and
(iii) Upon the effective date of a decision of the Trial Board affirming
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the decision of a sub-board in cases where a review has been granted by 
the ad hoc committee, and the Trial Board has affirmed the decision of 
such sub-board.
Section 4. A t any time after the publication in The CPA  of a statement of 
the case and decision, the Trial Board may, with respect to a case heard by it, 
initially or on review of a decision of a sub-board, and the sub-board may, 
with respect to a case heard by it in which its decision has become effective 
without a review by the Trial Board, by a two-thirds vote of the members 
present and voting, recall, rescind, or modify such expulsion or suspension, a 
statement of such action to be published in The CP A .
Section 5. (a) Should a judgment o f conviction or an order o f a govern­
mental authority on which the suspension or termination o f membership or 
affiliation o f a member or associate was based under Article V, Section 6(a), (b), 
(c) or(d) be reversed or otherwise set aside or invalidated, such suspension shall 
terminate or such member or associate shall becom e reinstated, when a certi­
fied copy o f the order reversing or otherwise setting aside or invalidating such 
conviction or order is filed with the secretary o f  the Institute.
(b) A  member or associate who has been suspended or expelled pursuant 
to Article V, Section 4(c), (d), (e) or (f), or expelled pursuant to Article V, 
Section 5, may request that the suspension terminate or request reinstatement 
if the judgment o f conviction, the order in finding o f court or the order o f the 
governmental authority, on which the suspension or expulsion was based, has 
been reversed or otherwise set aside or invalidated. Such request shall be re­
ferred to the committee on professional ethics which, after investigating all 
related circumstances, shall report the matter, with the committee’s recom­
mendation, to the Trial Board. Whereupon the Trial Board may, by a majority 
vote o f the members present and entitled to vote, terminate the suspension 
or reinstate such member or associate, after according him such hearing, if 
any, as may be appropriate.
(c) Except as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) o f this section, a member 
or associate whose membership or affiliation has been automatically termi­
nated under Article V, Section 6(b) or (d), or who has been expelled by the 
Trial Board or a sub-board, or whose resignation has been accepted by the 
Trial Board, an ad hoc committee thereof or a sub-board, may, at any time 
after three years from  the effective date o f such termination, expulsion or 
acceptance o f resignation, request reinstatement o f his membership or affilia­
tion. Such request shall be referred to the committee on professional ethics, 
which, after investigation, shall report the matter, with the committee’s rec­
ommendation, to the Trial Board. Whereupon the Trial Board may reinstate 
such member or associate on such terms and conditions as it shall determine 
to be appropriate. I f  an application for reinstatement under this paragraph is 
denied, the member or associate concerned may again apply for reinstatement 
at any time after two years from the date o f such denial.
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